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Abstract 
When it comes to ad-hoc networks, we refer to a technology which consists of wireless 
telecommunications network of dynamic topology, where a set of mobile communication 
nodes such as routers interact among themselves, passing on information without relying 
on any fixed infrastructure. Given this description, we find some limiting characteristics 
that make the Ad-Hoc wireless networks, very vulnerable to intruders and attacks that 
can damage the integrity of the network. Features such as the limited ability to process 
nodes, limited bandwidth, and an interaction that requires each node to be involved in 
decision making network make these networks a comprehensive field of study in 
communications. In this thesis, we intend to show in the security field above a specific 
type of intrusion that today has become very common for Ad-Hoc networks: Wormhole 
intrusion. We present a design of a mechanism to avoid this kind of intrusion based on 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography. This mechanism represents the result of several theoretical 
analysis about the intrusion, about the elliptic curve cryptography, about security in Ad-
Hoc and all this accompanied by the implementation of a series of simulations that show 
a proposed security protocol based on the Collaborative Agents application of anomaly 
detection, in conjunction with the Elliptic Curve Cryptography to conclude how this 
proposed solution is capable of addressing the Wormhole attack in mobile wireless 
networks. 
 
 
Key words: 1) Ad-Hoc, 2) Wormhole Intrusion, 3) Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 4) 
Performance Analysis, 5) State of the Art, 6) MANET Security.  
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Resumen 
Cuando hablamos de Redes Ad-Hoc, nos referimos a una tecnología que consiste en 
redes de telecomunicación inalámbrica de topología dinámica, donde un conjunto de 
nodos móviles de comunicación interactúan como enrutadores entre ellos 
transmitiéndose información sin depender de alguna infraestructura fija. Frente a esta 
descripción, nos encontramos con algunas características limitantes  que hacen de las 
redes inalámbricas Ad-Hoc, muy vulnerables al acceso de intrusos y ataques que 
pueden  dañar la integridad de la red. Características tales como la limitada capacidad 
de proceso en los nodos, un ancho de  banda limitado y una interacción que requiere 
que cada nodo se involucre en la toma de decisiones de la red hacen de este tipo de 
redes un campo de estudio exhaustivo en las comunicaciones. En esta tesis, se pretende 
mostrar dentro del campo mencionado de la seguridad un tipo de intrusión específica 
que hoy en día se ha vuelto muy común para las redes Ad-Hoc: La intrusión Wormhole. 
Se presenta un diseño de un mecanismo capaz de evadir este tipo de intrusión basado 
en criptografía de Curvas Elípticas. Este mecanismo, representa el resultado de varios 
análisis teóricos sobre la intrusión, sobre la criptografía de curvas elípticas, sobre la 
seguridad en Ad-Hoc y todo esto acompañado de la implementación de una serie de 
simulaciones que muestran un protocolo de seguridad propuesto basado en la aplicación 
de Agentes Colaborativos de detección de anomalías, junto a la Criptografía de Curvas 
Elípticas con el fin de concluir cómo esta solución propuesta es capaz de hacer frente al 
ataque Wormhole en redes móviles inalámbricas. 
 
Título de la Tesis en Español: “Un mecanismo de identificación de nodos basado en 
criptografía para la detección de la intrusión Wormhole en redes Ad-Hoc”. 
 
Palabras clave: 1) Ad-Hoc, 2) Intrusión Agujero de Gusano, 3) Criptografía de Curvas 
Elípticas, 4) Análisis de Rendimiento, 5) Estado del Arte, 6) Seguridad en MANET. 
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 Introduction 
A MANET (Mobile Ad-Hoc Network) [1] is a set of autonomous and spontaneous routers 
or mobile nodes that communicate with each other through wireless connections, where 
there is no fixed network infrastructure and management is done distributed. That's how 
the nodes are involved in routing algorithms and security. 
To the features of these important and useful networks such as the limited ability to 
process the nodes with high bandwidth connections scarce, dynamic topology and power 
constraints must be added vulnerability to attacks from intruders. Security in these 
networks is a challenge, even more when it comes to intrusions as Wormhole tunnel [3]. 
There are three aspects in the field of Ad-Hoc network security: the Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS), Secure routing and Authentication Access via key management [87]. The 
present research focuses on building a solution that combines these three aspects 
applied to the reactive routing protocol AODV (Ad-Hoc On Demand Distance Vector 
Routing) [91] and using Elliptic Curve Cryptography [44] for detection and avoidance of a 
specific type of intrusion called Wormhole [3]. In the end there will be constructed a series 
of simulations that demonstrate the application of the solution and its behavior in a 
MANET environment. 

  
 
1. Chapter 1  
1.1 Motivation 
Wormhole is an attack on the routing protocol of the network where 2 colluder nodes or 
more intercept packets of information while traveling at a point A of the network, and 
quickly reinserted in another physical point B in the same network creating a "tunnel "from 
A to B [3]. By intercepting packets, the attacker could practically do with them as he 
pleases. 
 
Some proposals to counter this type of attack have been raised. Some proposals have 
been of physical type [4]. Others are focused on how to attack the intruder from the 
network's geographic area (location of the nodes, distances between them, location of 
failures), [3], [5], [6], [8], other by analysis of the transmission times of nodes [7], [9] and 
other focused on monitoring routing [10]. Some studies even say that while there is a 
system of authentication and encryption, the attack can be carried out [2], [3].  
 
Based on these studies, several questions arise: What happens then to all the proposed 
solutions based on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) and applied to Ad-Hoc networks 
that claim to guarantee security in such networks? Can an ECC applied to Ad-Hoc 
networks alone prevent, detect, evade and/or eliminate a Wormhole attack?, If not, is it 
necessary to satisfy the criteria of integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and 
application availability combine a cryptosystem with some of the solutions already 
proposed to attack the Wormhole intrusion?. 
 
But, Why ECC? Today, it is becoming increasingly common the implementation of the 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for Ad-Hoc networks, because compared to 
cryptosystems such as RSA, ECC offers equivalent security level with smaller key sizes, 
faster computing, with low power and memory consumption and savings in bandwidth 
[11], which are precisely the characteristics that make it attractive to apply in this type of 
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networks with limited resources [12]. For this reason this study focuses on assessing the 
level of security offered by these new proposals based on elliptic curve cryptography for 
Wormhole intrusion. 
 
The suggestion is to validate the ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography [44], analyzing their 
ability to escape detection and intrusion Wormhole, without the use of physical devices in 
addition to the existing network and to demonstrate its efficiency in MANET. 
1.2 Main Goal 
To implement in a computer simulation a technique of Wormhole intrusion detection in 
Ad-Hoc networks using elliptic curve cryptography on AODV routing protocol. 
1.3 Specific Goals 
 Implement a computer simulation of reactive routing protocol AODV, in a MANET. 
 Implement a computer simulation Wormhole attack with its features. 
 Implement a computer simulation technique Elliptic Curve Cryptography for the 
implementation of intrusion detection. 
 Conduct job evaluation in the final simulation experiments to present the statistical 
results obtained and determine the quality of the intrusion detection measured in 
terms of effectiveness. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into 5 chapters. The first introductory chapter discusses the topic, 
the motivation and objectives that are intended to achieve and the explanation of the 
structure of the document. The second chapter sets the state of the art on the Ad-hoc 
networks, mobility models, routing, intrusion Wormhole, elliptic curve cryptography and 
some results of previous work on wormhole tunnel safety and application of elliptic curves 
are not directed towards this attack. In the third chapter describes the proposed solution 
based on cryptography, showing the development of simulations that support it. In the 
fourth chapter shows the simulations and the description of results. In the fifth chapter 
gives the conclusions, references and the additional data are appended.  
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2. Chapter 2 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
Wireless networks have had a dizzying acceptance and expansion due to the proliferation 
of inexpensive wireless devices, widely available in the marketplace and the community's 
interest in mobile computing networks. 
 
However, the uses of such networks go beyond the customized business use. In 
situations where the infrastructure is not available, or where it is not trusted to use Ad-Hoc 
networks becomes essential, even for emergencies. Some examples include: 
communication of military soldiers in the field, sensors scattered throughout a city for 
biological or climatological use; network infrastructure laptops in a conference or college, 
rare animal tracking, space exploration, undersea operations and the deployment of 
temporary offices [92] are some of the uses to which it can give this type of network, not 
counting future what could be many other applications such as communication between 
mobile robots [93], or the use of mobile devices in the process of rescue on a Colombian 
geography and geographical areas where there are highly rugged relief. 
 
However, the use of networks such as functional has some limitations that will gradually 
have been mitigated in terms of research. Routing, security, maintenance, use of physical 
network resources, service quality [94] are some of the topics that have been studying 
and dealing with day to day to try to improve the use of the Ad-Hoc Mobile Networks also 
known as MANET. 
 
There is much that we can talk about this type of networks, however this research is 
focused on the issue of security, and more specifically, the application of algorithms 
based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography to evade one of the attacks that threaten the 
common security of such networks, the wormhole attack.  
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2.2 AD-HOC Features 
Among the salient features of the Ad-hoc networks are [1], [92], [95], [96] and [97]: No 
fixed base stations - the deployment is fast, the network topology is highly dynamic multi-
hop, found in hostile environments (with losses and / or noise) and connectivity is 
sporadic, automatically creates and adapts to changes, it multilayer within 
telecommunications networks (physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport 
layer, etc.), the network layer needs to calculate the trajectories of a way to keep 
communication efficiency when changing the bandwidth links is a luxury, a key 
assumption is that not all nodes can communicate directly with each other and 
applications must be designed to handle the disconnection and reconnection maintaining 
stability.  
 
Figure 2-1: Graphical Representation of an Ad-Hoc Network 
. 
 
 
2.3 Mobility Models 
A MANET mobility model is the algorithm that describes the behavior nodes with Ad-Hoc 
network to move within a given area. Some of the models in the literature are: Random 
Waypoint, Gauss-Markov mobility model city and group mobility model with benchmark 
[109]. For this research will be chosen Random Waypoint (RWP) to implement in the 
simulations will be developed later, as this model represents many real situations MANET 
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implementations. The RWP model has been extensively studied and in the literature there 
are some variants of it, however we will use the algorithm that consists of the following: 
Each node in the network to move is in a pause between changing direction and speed. 
Each node starts at a random location with a long pause. After the break expires the node 
chooses a random destination and speed. It moves with the speed set to the destination 
chosen. Upon arriving begins again with a random break and returns to chooses a 
random destination and speed.  
 
Figure 2-1: Random Waypoint Mobility Model (RWP). 
 
 
 
2.4 Types of Routing Protocols 
Generally there are several taxonomy proposals for the classification of routing protocols 
in Ad-Hoc networks [98]. However, the most used is the one where the protocols are 
divided into three groups: proactive, reactive and hybrid [98]. 
 
Proactive protocols maintain a route to all nodes, even when not needed at the time of the 
communication using the route. Reactive protocols seek the communication path from 
one node to another on demand and not stored as proactive protocols, it seeks better use 
of bandwidth. Finally, hybrid protocols mix the functionality of proactive and reactive 
protocols defining hierarchies between the nodes of the network and maintaining 
information on the status of local topology.  
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There are many proposals that can be listed in the history of research on routing protocols 
for ad hoc networks. However, at present only speak of three proposals that have been 
maintained despite the stiff competition. These proposals are:  
 
- “Ad-Hoc On Demand Distance Vector” (AODV) [91] 
- “Dynamic Source Routing for Protocol Mobile Ad- Hoc Networks” (DSR) [99] 
- “Optimized Link State Routing Protocol” (OLSR) [100] 
 
AODV and DSR use reactive routing also known as on-demand routing. The 
disadvantage of reactive protocols is in the initial delay of having to discover the route per 
demand which may affect interactive applications that require QoS, such as interactive 
audio and video. However, the use of a scarce resource such as bandwidth is optimal.  
 
OLSR uses proactive routing. The disadvantage of such protocols is the level of network 
overhead; however, they can select valid routes almost immediately. 
For this research we use the reactive protocol AODV. 
2.4.1 AODV (Ad-Hoc On Demand Distance Vector) 
It consists of a reactive or on-demand protocol [91], that is to say find a route only when 
needed, based on distance vector routing [101], which avoids the problems of count to 
infinity and the formation of loops. For control, use sequence numbers for each of the 
destinations, so only maintains routes to nodes with which it maintains active 
communications. In the nodes, the routing table stored for a limited time each of the 
entries, so if that time expires the routes are eliminated and must restart a new route 
search process for the destination, each entry has an associated sequence number which 
is used to check how new is the path and thereby avoid loops. 
2.4.1.1 Operation 
When is needed a route from a source node (Source) to a destination node (Destination), 
it floods the network with requests RREQ (Route REQuest) from the source. When a 
RREQ reaches the intended destination or any node that knows a route to the destination, 
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it generates a response RREP (Route Reply). The RREP knows how back to the source 
as the flooding of RREQ was created way back. When the RREP is going back to the 
source, it creates the way there. Once the source has received the RREP, you can send 
datagrams, which will follow the path round to the destination. 
2.4.1.2 Features 
a) Each node has a routing table. 
b) Although the topology changes, an individual route is a time to live (TTL). 
c) Hop by Hop Routing. 
d) Each router decides the next hop only. 
e) No node has a complete graph of the network. 
f) For each possible destination only known where the first jump and the distance should 
be directed to the one found. 
g) Use of a destination sequence number for each entry in the routing table. This number 
is created by the destination node. 
h) The sequence number included in a RREQ or a RREP packet is sent to applicants. 
Guarantees do not remain in loops and is simple to program. They are used by other 
nodes to determine how new the routing information is. If a node has the possibility to 
choose between two routes to a destination, a node must choose the one that has the 
highest sequence number. 
i) The information has just expired, typically after a few seconds. 
j) Each node maintains information about its neighbors with periodic HELLO messages, 
TTL = 1. 
k) Each node maintains routing information live (active). 
l) If a change in the neighborhood affects a living path, an error is reported to generate 
new searches 
2.4.1.3 RREQ message contains 
a) Request ID (for flood control). 
b) IP address of the destination. 
c) Sequence number. 
d) TTL. 
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2.4.1.4 RREP message contains 
a) Destination IP address 
b) Prefix Size 
c) Destination Sequence Number 
d) The next hop IP address 
e) Lifetime (expiration or deletion time of the route) 
f) Number of hops (to reach the destination) 
g) Network interface 
h) Other state and routing flags (valid, invalid). 
 
2.4.1.5 Example 
 
Step 1: D wants to communicate with K 
Figure 2-1: AODV Step 1 
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Step 2: The node D sends a message all its neighbors RREQ to find a route to the 
destination K. 
Figure 2-2: AODV Step 2. 
 
Step 3: Each node receiving the RREQ sends a copy of the route (Reverse Path) for the 
node. 
Figure 2-3: AODV Step 3. 
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Step 4: A path can be determined when the RREQ reaches a node that provides access 
to the destination (can be the destination node itself). 
Figure 2-4: AODV Step 4. 
 
             
 
Step 5: The path is made available by sending back a RREP message from K and written 
on that route in the routing table D. After receiving the response from the road each node 
has to update its routing table if the sequence number is more recent. 
Figure 2-5: AODV Step 5. 
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Step 6: Then, node D can now communicate with node K 
 Figure 2-6: AODV Step 6. 
. 
      
 
When it detects a link break in an active route overrides this and sends a route error 
message RERR (Route Error) to other nodes. If the nodes have a route in its routing table 
with this link, the route is cleared. The node D sends back a route request to its 
neighboring nodes, or node on the path may try to find a route to K. This mechanism is 
called Local Route Repair (Figure 2-9). 
Figure 2-7: AODV - RERR Message. 
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2.4.2 AODV: Advantages Over Other Routing Protocols 
Within the study of performance comparison between different routing protocols for ad 
hoc networks, we found certain advantages in reactive protocols in sending information in 
[1], [102] and [103]. One such feature is the high adaptability of the protocol in different 
mobility models found in Ad-Hoc network. Also, by its nature reactive saves Energy and 
Bandwidth on the network, resources that are vital and scarce in these networks. 
2.5 The Wormhole Intrusion 
2.5.1 Definition 
A Wormhole is an attack against the routing protocol [2] in a MANET where two or more 
nodes create the illusion that two remote regions of the network are directly connected 
through nodes that appear to be neighbors, but they are actually distant to each other 
[13]. This shortcut is created by connecting the apparent neighbors through a secret 
communication channel or tunnel, which is generated by an attacker that introduces 
transceivers connected to each other with a high quality, low-latency link [4]. In this way, 
the attacker takes the transmitted packets in one region and reinsert them into another 
region. 
As shown in Figure 2.10: X and Y represent the Wormhole nodes connected through a 
tunnel that creates the illusion that region 1 and region 2 are directly connected, making 
believe that “A” is a neighbor node of “J”. 
Figure 2-1: Intrusion in Ad-Hoc Network with Wormhole Tunnel. 
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The attacker is invisible in the upper layers, unlike a malicious node in a routing protocol, 
which can easily be identified, the presence of the Wormhole and the attackers involved 
in the endpoints of the tunnel are not visible on the route [3]. 
2.5.2 Actions That Wormhole Can Perform 
There are several negative repercussions for Ad-Hoc networking when a Wormhole 
attack is successful. The consequences could be, according to [3]:  
- Eavesdrop on communication: Process for intercepting packets flowing on the network. 
- Spoofing attack: Inject bogus packets, impersonating another sender. 
- Record packets: Using eavesdropping on communication, are generated copies of 
intercepted packets flowing on the network. 
- Replay the packets: Passively can re-inserting the packets elsewhere on the network. 
Actively follow the same process but altering the intercepted packets. 
- Unauthorized Access: The malicious node enters to a group or subgroup of nodes, 
masquerading as a belonging node to the network. 
- Disrupt routing: In the route discovery process the attack generates interruption of the 
normal flow of the protocols in the search for a valid path. One consequence of this attack 
can be a Sinkhole attack [60] where modifying routing packets and masquerading as a 
trusted node, the attacker attracts other nodes so that all traffic passes through it, in order 
to launch after centralized attacks. 
- Denial-of-Service (DoS): After having supplanted as reliable nodes that contain valid 
routes to send packets, malicious nodes discard all messages received and not sent to 
the destination node. This attack is also known as Black Hole Attack [61].  
- Selectively discarding data packets: It is a Black Hole Attack but not drop all the 
intercepted packages, only some of them. This attack is known as Gray Hole Attack [61]. 
- Clandestine Traffic Analysis [2]: At a given time t the Wormhole tunnel obtained the 
traffic statistics from the network to use them against it. 
- Creating routing loops [4]: To waste the energy of the network. 
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The attack directly affects the network routing protocols both reactive and proactive 
routing. [3]. 
In Reactive protocols: 
According to [3], when the network uses on-demand routing protocols such as AODV or 
DSR, the attacker can penetrate into the route discovery process tunneling each ROUTE 
REQUEST packet directly to the destination target node of the REQUEST. The 
destination node receiving the message RREQ, it answers to attacker who is 
impersonating a trusted node. Being able to interconnect two different regions of the 
network, the attacker becomes a preferred node for the route discovery process by 
making the destination node discards the other received ROUTE REQUEST. 
In Proactive protocols: 
For protocols such as DSDV, several colluding Attackers can create a tunnel through 
which pass each advertisement sent by routing nodes within the network. This will make 
two nodes far apart to believe that they are neighbors. In determining the best number of 
hops required for communication, the nodes within the network end up relying on colluder 
nodes and there attacks occur. 
According to previous studies, these consequences of the attack could be implemented 
even if there is a system used for authentication and encryption in the network [2], [3]. 
That is, ensure that a cryptosystem is not enough to counter a Wormhole attack. This is 
one of the reasons for doing this study: Analyze these assertions and from them to study 
the recent implementation of the ECC to verify their behavior to an attack such as 
Wormhole. 
2.5.3 Wormhole Types 
Previous studies have been mentioned some classifications of the Wormhole attack.  
In [14] Wormhole attack is classified according to its mode of attack and depending on 
whether the attackers are visible on the route. In [2] Wormhole is classified according to 
the resources used for the attack. 
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2.5.3.1 According to its mode of attack 
Wormhole is classified as [14]: 
- Wormhole using encapsulation: Between two colluder nodes a tunnel is generated 
through which pass the RREQ messages which were received by a Node A which 
encapsulates the route request and sends it to the other node which decapsulates it 
and forwards the RREQ. 
- Wormhole Out-of-Band Channel: Using a long-range directional wireless link or a 
direct wired link nodes send RREQs between them. 
- Wormhole with High Power Transmission: A node gets a RREQ, it broadcasts it at a 
high power level, Any node that hears the high-power broadcasts, rebroadcasts it 
towards the destination. 
- Wormhole using Packet Relay: Nodes relay Packets between two distant nodes to 
convince them that they are neighbors. 
- Wormhole using Protocol Deviations: Nodes do not back off to let the request packet it 
forwards arrive first at the destination. 
2.5.3.2 Depending on whether the attackers are visible in the path 
Wormhole is classified as [14]:  
- Open Wormhole Attack: The attackers include themselves in the RREQ packet 
header following the route discovery procedure. Other nodes are aware that the 
malicious nodes lie on the path but they would think that the malicious nodes are 
direct neighbors. 
- Half open Wormhole Attack: One side of wormhole does not modify the packet and 
only another side modifies the packet, following the route discovery procedure. 
- Closed Wormhole Attack: The attackers do not modify the content of the packet, even 
the packet in a route discovery packet. Instead, they simply tunnel the packet from 
one side of wormhole to another side and it rebroadcasts the packet. 
2.5.3.3 Depending on the resources used for the attack  
Wormhole is classified as [2]: 
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- Out-of-band wormholes: The colluder nodes establish a direct link between the two 
end-points of the wormhole tunnel in the network. This link is established using an 
external wired link or a long-range wireless transmission. This type of attack is also 
known as Hidden Wormhole Attack [15], using only hardware introduced by the 
attacker and without compromising any hosts in the network. The “Out-of-band” 
concept initially was introduced in [3]. 
- In-band wormholes: An in-band wormhole does not require any additional hardware 
infrastructure. It consumes existing communication medium capacity for routing the 
tunneled traffic. Thus, the belonging nodes on the network will be involved in the 
attack. The “In-band” concept initially was introduced in [13] although it has been 
studied in another as [16], [17] and [18]. According to [13], this type of attack is 
subdivided into 2 types: Self-contained in-band wormhole and Extended in-band 
wormhole. 
- Self-contained in-band Wormhole: Is a subtype of “In-band wormhole”. Using the 
resources of the network and involving other nodes within the network, intruders 
create a false link between the attacker nodes themselves. 
- Extended in-band Wormhole: Also known as Exposed Wormhole Attack [15] and also 
known as Byzantine Wormhole Attack [19], is another subtype of “In-band Wormhole”. 
Creates a wormhole that extends beyond the attackers forming the tunnel endpoints. 
A false link is advertised between two nodes that are not the attacker nodes. 
2.5.4 Proposed Solutions Against The Wormhole Attack 
The proposed solutions to counter the Wormhole attack are based on the symptoms that 
may suffer a network with the presence of a tunnel. According to [20] some of these 
Symptoms may be:  
- Longer propagation time than generally expected one 
- Larger delay per hop than any other usual route 
- Bigger transmission range than that of normal node 
- Previous node that is not a neighbor 
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Based on these symptoms [20], knowing that the tunnel is an attack against the routing 
protocol in the network [2], and taking the related works mentioned in [25], [26] and [27], 
we classify the proposed solutions against Wormhole attack in: 
- Location-based, Distance-based and Time-based 
- Hop-Count Analysis 
- Graph-based and Geometric-based 
- Neighbor monitoring-based 
- Statistical 
- Key-based 
2.5.4.1 Location-based, Distance-based and Time-based 
That kind of proposals are based on clock synchronization, flags or marks on packets and 
use of additional hardware such as GPS, ultrasound or antennas in order to analyze 
geographic location of nodes in a network, measuring the distance between transmitter 
and receiver, and measurement transfer latencies of the packets to determine speed of 
reception and communication and to catalog some as suspicious that they are possibly 
Wormhole tunnels. Among the solutions are: [3], [4], [9], [10], [15], [19], [21-24]. 
2.5.4.2 Hop-count Analysis 
These are proposals that examine the number of hops that requires transmission of a 
packet from a source node to a destination node in order to analyze the probability of a 
Wormhole attack when the number of hops is unusual. Among the proposals are: [28] and 
[29]. 
2.5.4.3 Graph-based and Geometric-based  
These solutions propose to construct graphical models of network links based on the 
transmission range of nodes, in order to determine what types of communications are 
allowed and which not, based on a graphic model or geometric pattern. Some of them 
are: [5], [8], [27], [30-33]. 
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2.5.4.4 Neighbor monitoring-based 
Is the analysis of the behavior of neighboring nodes, when each belonging node on the 
network participates in the routing process, where is validate in their routing lists, the 
confidence level of the neighbor node with whom it is communicating. Among the 
solutions are: [8], [20], [34], [35], [36], [37]. 
2.5.4.5 Statistical 
Proposals are described as through statistical analysis based on calculating the number 
of routes generated during routing with the frequency of occurrence of these can be 
detected in the observation of unusual behavior to the possible existence of a Wormhole 
tunnel. Some of these proposals are: [38], [39]. 
2.5.4.6 Key-based 
Proposals are based on authentication between nodes that require additional geographic 
component to determine the location of the nodes and to identify possible locations 
between authentication and intrusion. An example is: [40] (Note that this type of 
authentication solution requires additional security component). 
2.6 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
2.6.1 Definition  
An Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) [44] is a public key system based on Diffie-Hellman 
methods and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), but instead of using whole numbers as 
the symbols of the alphabet of the message to digitally sign or encrypt, uses points in a 
mathematical object called Elliptic Curve.  
An elliptic curve is a plane curve defined by a cubic equation (third degree) as: 
ݕଶ + ܽଵݔݕ + ܽଷݕ = ݔଷ + ܽଶݔଶ + ܽସݔ + ܽହ		(1) 
For example, a representation of an elliptic curve over the field of real numbers (ℝ) would 
be: 
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Figure 2-1: Elliptic curves over the field ℝ. 
 
Where the curve A is the representation of equation (1) with a1=a2=a3=0; a4 =-1; a5=1 and 
curve B is the representation of equation (1) with a1=a2=a3=a5=0;  a4 =-1, ie: 
Curve A:	ݕଶ = ݔଷ − ݔ + 1               Curve B:	ݕଶ = ݔଷ − ݔ 
According to [48] there are some preliminary considerations to be taken into account 
before implementing the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), however in 
this review we shall take them in general for any application of ECC. Considerations 
involve choosing: 
1. A Type of underlying finite field ॲq (ॲp or ॲ2m). 
2. A Field representation (Polynomial or Normal Basis for ॲ2
m). 
3. A Type of elliptic curve E over ॲq (Random curve or Koblitz curve). 
4. An Elliptic curve point representation (Affine Coordinates or Projective coordinates). 
2.6.2 The Finite Field In ECC 
An elliptic curve with an appropriate arithmetic Cryptography usually defined on two fields 
[45]:  
- The prime finite field ℤp over the ℤ numbers where p is an odd prime and the field ℤp 
containing  p elements. 
- The binary finite field ॲ2
m  containing 2m elements, with m ≥ 1. 
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A field ॲq is a finite field when q = pm, where p is prime [48]. The order of the field is of q 
elements. ॲp, ॲ2m, and ॲpm where p is prime are called Galois Fields (GF), or also 
known as GF(p), GF(ॲ2m), and GF(ॲpm), respectively. In a field ℤp, an elliptic curve 
E over ℤp, denoted E(ℤp), is defined by the equation of the form: 
y2 ≡ x3 + ax + b (mod p)   (2) 
where p is an odd prime, and a, b ∈ ℤp, satisfy: 
4a3 + 27b2 <> 0 (mod p)  (3) 
Denote now an extra point on the curve at an infinitely place above the vertical axis and 
that is the identity of the elliptic curve group, such that added it to any point P results the 
point P. This point is called the point at infinity Ο. 
Thus the set E(ℤp) with point Ο is the set of all solutions or points P= (x,y), for  x,y ∈ 
ℤp that satisfy the equation (2). 
On the other hand, taking the finite field of Galois ॲ2
m, which consists of the two elements 
0 and 1, with m ≥ 1 an elliptic curve E (not supersingular) over ॲ2m, denoted E(ॲ2m),  is 
defined by the equation of the form: 
y2+ xy = x3 + ax2 + b on ॲ2m   (4) 
where a, b ∈ ॲ2m, b ≠ 0 on ॲ2m and E(ॲ2m) is the set of all solutions or points P = (x 
,y), for x,y ∈ ॲ2m  that satisfy the equation (4), with the point at infinity Ο. 
The elements of a finite field ॲ2
m with m ≥ 1 can be represented by all binary 
polynomials of degree ≤ m - 1 as follows [48]: 
ॲଶ೘ = ൛ܽ௠ିଵݔ௠ିଵ + ܽ௠ିଶݔ௠ିଶ + ⋯+ ܽଵݔ + ܽ଴|ܽ௜ ∈ {0,1}ൟ			(5) 
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This representation makes these fields are very useful for applications in cryptography, 
since its elements fit neatly into a data word length of m bits of the form (ܽ௠ିଵܽ௠ିଶ … ܽଵܽ଴). For example a point A ϵ ॲ24 is a 4-bit binary word such that  A 
= (ܽଷܽଶܽଵܽ଴) ≠ (0000). 
2.6.3 Computational Levels and Field Representation 
According to [44], the structure of an ECC operation has three computational levels: 
Figure 2-12: Computational levels of an ECC. 
 
- Scalar Arithmetic Level: In this computational Level the Scalar multiplication 
algorithm is applied. The scalar multiplication calculation is kP where k is a positive 
integer and P denotes the point that is added k copies to itself.  
݇ܲ = 	 ∑ ܲ				௞௜ୀଵ (6) 
- Point Arithmetic Level: In this computational Level point addition and point 
doubling operations are applied. Point addition is to take two points P and Q of the curve 
and add them, resulting in a third point as follows: 
ܲ + ܳ = ܴ			(7) 
Point doubling is to add two times the same point P: 2ܲ = ܴ									(8) 
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Point Doubling is a special case of the sum, because is the addition of a point to himself. 
However it is defined independently to optimize its implementation. 
In the top layer computation of ECC, the scalar Multiplication requires multiples 
calculations of the Point addition (P ≠ Q) and Point doubling (P = Q). This procedure is 
the pillar on public key cryptography using elliptic curves. Let P and Q two points of the 
elliptic curve with P = (x1 , y1) and Q = (x2 , y2). The result of adding P + Q = R = (x3 , 
y3) is obtained from the following equations: 
ݔଷ = ߣଶ + ߣ + 	ݔଵ + ݔଶ + ܽ				(9) 
ݕଷ = ߣ(ݔଵ + ݔଷ) + ݔଷ + ݕଵ					(10) 
ߣ = ൞ݕଶ + ݕଵݔଶ + ݔଵ 				,				ܲ ≠ ܳݕଵ
ݔଵ
+ ݔଵ			,				ܲ = ܳ  
There is another operation on this computational level called point tripling. According to 
[41] in the effort of some approaches to compute faster scalar multiplications, such as 
ternary/binary method [46] and double-base chain [47] was introduced the point tripling 
operation. 
Point tripling is to add three times the same point P: 3ܲ = ܴ(11) 
- Field Arithmetic Level: In this computational Level is important to differentiate the 
ॲq finite field (ॲp or ॲ2m) to which operations are applied and depending on the field, the 
basis representation being used for that field. In this computational Level the addition, 
multiplication, squaring and inversion field operations can be applied. 
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For example, for the Finite Field ॲ2
m the multiplication rule depends on the basis selected 
[48], and usually are taken two kinds of bases: Polynomial Bases and Normal Bases 
(within the latter is the implementation: Gaussian Normal Bases – GNB of ANSI X9.62 
[48]). 
 
To minimize the explanation of this computational level we take only finite field GF(ॲ2m) 
with m ≥ 1,and with a Polynomial Bases representation. For further details of the 
arithmetic of this computational level to know the operations applied on GF(ॲp) and 
GF(ॲ2m), and according to the Basis Representation of GF(ॲ2m), to know the 
operations applied on Polynomial Bases and Normal Bases, is suggested deepen in [44] 
and [48]. 
 
Previously we had shown the representation of field elements in ॲ2
m with a Polynomial 
Basis Representation in (5), where we said that a field element is usually denoted by the 
bit string of the form (ܽ௠ିଵܽ௠ିଶ …ܽଵܽ଴).  
In this field (GF(ॲ2m)), with this Basis Representation (Polynomial) operations that can 
be applied are: addition, multiplication and inversion [48]. 
 Addition:  
The sum of two elements A, B ϵ GF(ॲ2m) with: 
A = (ܽ௠ିଵܽ௠ିଶ …ܽଵܽ଴) and B = (ܾ௠ିଵܾ௠ିଶ … ܾଵܾ଴) is equal to: 
A + B = C = (ܿ௠ିଵܿ௠ିଶ … ܿଵܿ଴) 
where	ܿ௜ = 	 (ܽ௜ + ܾ௜)		݉݋݀	2 
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 Multiplication: 
The Multiplication of two elements A, B ϵ GF(ॲ2m) with: 
A = (ܽ௠ିଵܽ௠ିଶ …ܽଵܽ଴) and B = (ܾ௠ିଵܾ௠ିଶ … ܾଵܾ଴) is equal to: 
A ∙ B = ं= (ं௠ିଵं௠ିଶ … ଵं ଴ं) where the polynomial: 
	ं௠ିଵݔ
௠ିଵ + ं௠ିଶݔ௠ିଶ + ⋯+ ଵंݔ + ଴ं	 
is the remainder when the polynomial (ܽ௠ିଵݔ௠ିଵ + ܽ௠ିଶݔ௠ିଶ + ⋯+ ܽଵݔ + ܽ଴)
∙ (ܾ௠ିଵݔ௠ିଵ + ܾ௠ିଶݔ௠ିଶ + ⋯+ ܾଵݔ + ܾ଴) 
is divided by an irreducible polynomial f(x) of degree m over ॲ2 such that: 
݂(ݔ) = ݔ௠ + ௠݂ିଵݔ௠ିଵ + ௠݂ିଶݔ௠ିଶ + ⋯+ ଶ݂ݔଶ + ଵ݂ݔ + ଴݂ 
Where ௜݂ ∈ {0,1} for i = 0,1,…,m-2,m-1 
 Inversion: 
The inversion of an element  A ϵ GF(ॲ2m) denoted A-1 with: 
A = (ܽ௠ିଵܽ௠ିଶ …ܽଵܽ଴) and A ≠ 0 in ॲ2m is the unique element C ϵ GF(ॲ2m) for 
which ܣ ∙ ܥ = 1. 
2.6.4 Domain Parameters and Types of Elliptic Curves  
Domain parameters of elliptic curves are the basic values needed to define the finite field 
to use. In general, [49] describes the Elliptic curve domain parameters over ॲp
m like an 
octuplet: 
ܶ	 = 	 (݌,݉, ݂(ݔ), ܽ,ܾ,ܩ, ݊, ℎ) 
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a) p and m specifying the finite field ॲpm 
b) An irreducible polynomial f(x) of degree m to determine the representation of ॲpm 
c) Two elements a, b ϵ ॲpm specifying the elliptic curve E(ॲpm), defined by the 
equation: E:y2 = x3 + ax + b   in ॲpm 
d) A base point G = (xG, yG) on E(ॲpm) 
e) A prime n which is the order of G 
f) An integer h which is the cofactor h = #E(ॲpm)/n. 
More specifically we can define the domain parameters over ॲp and ॲ2m [50], [51]. 
2.6.4.1 Curve Domain Parameters over ॲp  
The parameters that define the domain of elliptic curves over ॲp  [50] are a sextuple of 
the form: 
ܶ	 = 	 (݌,ܽ, ܾ,ܩ,݊, ℎ) 
These parameters already explained previously generally. For T, the curve E(ॲp) is 
defined by the equation (2). 
2.6.4.2 Curve Domain Parameters over ॲ2m   
The parameters that define the domain of elliptic curves over ॲ2
m [50] are a septuplet of 
the form: 
ܶ	 = 	 (݉,݂(ݔ), ܽ, ܾ,ܩ, ݊,ℎ) 
These parameters have already been explained previously in a general way. For T, the 
curve E(ॲ2m) is defined by the equation (4). 
To see the detail of the generation and validation of these domain parameters for curves 
over ॲp and over ॲ2m see [50]. 
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In [52] NIST presented a list of 15 elliptic curves that were recommended for U.S. Federal 
Government use. This revised standard is called FIPS 186-2.  NIST describes that when 
choosing appropriate curves must take into account two types: Pseudo-random curves 
and Special curves. 
- Pseudo-random curves  
Are those whose coefficients are generated from the output of a seeded cryptographic 
hash. If the seed value is given along with the coefficients, it can be verified easily that the 
coefficients were indeed generated by that method [52]. 
 
- Special curves  
Whose coefficients and underlying field have been selected to optimize the efficiency of 
the elliptic curve operations [52]. 
According to [52], elliptic curves suitable for ECC taking into account the finite field 
GF(ॲq) can be: Pseudo-random curve over GF(ॲp), pseudo-random curve over 
GF(ॲ2m)and special curve over GF(ॲ2m) called a Koblitz Curve or Anomalous Binary 
Curve. For more detail see [52]. 
2.6.5 Elliptic Curve Point Representation  
One problem faced by the ECC in the direct calculation of equations (9) and (10) of the 
Point Arithmetic Level is that to obtain the sum of points is necessary to calculate two field 
inversions, which is a very expensive operation since computational point of view 
considering that is ten times more expensive than a multiplication. To avoid the use of 
field inversions, the representations of points called Projective Coordinates are used. 
 
The Affine Coordinates are those such that each point in the coordinate system is 
represented by the vector (x, y). The Projective Coordinates system is a system 
representation of   Affine Coordinates creating an equivalence relation of a point using 
three coordinates X, Y, and Z of the form (x,y,z)~(X,Y,Z). According to [46] the 
equivalence class containing (X,Y,Z) is: 
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(X : Y : Z)={(λcX , λdY, λZ) : λϵGF(ॲ2m)} 
(X : Y : Z) is called a Projective Point, and (X,Y,Z) is called a Representative Point of 
that class. (X : Y : Z) with Z ≠ 0 corresponds to the affine coordinates x = X/Zc and y = 
Y/Zd where the fixed exponential integers c and d over GF(ॲ2m) will determine the 
characteristics of the arithmetic of elliptic curves and therefore the definition of the 
algorithm of addition of points in this representation. 
 
There are several types of projective coordinates [54], [55], [56], [57]. A Projective 
Coordinates (X,Y,Z) corresponds to an Affine Coordinates (x,y) as follows: 
- Ordinary Projective or Homogenous Projective: with c=1 and d=1 where: 
(x,y) =(X/Z , Y/Z). 
- Jacobian Projective: with c= 2 and d= 3 where: 
(x,y) =(X/Z2 , Y/Z3). 
- Lopez –Dahab Projective: with c= 1 and d= 2 where: 
(x,y) =(X/Z , Y/Z2). 
- ML–Projective: A Projective Coordinates (X,Y,Z,T) with T= Z2, c= 1 and d=3 where: 
(x,y) =(X/T , Y/Z3). 
For example, in Ordinary or Homogenous Projective Coordinates, the curve equation (1) 
can be expressed as: 
Y2Z + XYZ = X3 + aX2Z + bZ3 
And in Lopez – Dahab Projective Coordinates the curve equation (1) can be expressed 
as: 
32 A Cryptography-Based Mechanism For Identifying Nodes Applied To Detection 
Of Wormhole Intrusion In Ad-Hoc Networks 
 
Y2 + XYZ = X3Z+ aX2Z2 + bZ4 
To know the operations applied to different projected coordinate systems is 
recommended to see [54], [55], [56], [57]. 
2.7 ECC Implementations for MANET (Related Work) 
2.7.1 ECC Schemes 
As mentioned above, an Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) is based on the methods of 
Diffie-Hellman and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). These in turn are based on the 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) [62]. The problem is finding an integer x such that 
ߙ௫ = ߚ that is, in general, the definition of GDLP (Generalized Discrete Logarithm 
Problem). Thus the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) based on the 
DLP consists of an elliptic curve E on ॲq, a point G ϵ E (ॲq) of order n (odd and large 
number) and a scalar multiple Q of G, to find an integer k such that: Q = kG (see Scalar 
Multiplication in the section 2.6.3 of this document). This is a difficult problem to solve, 
also allows all the DLP-based cryptosystems can be adapted using elliptic curves [63]. 
 
According to [63]: The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement scheme is a 
variant of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm (ECDSA) is a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). The Elliptic 
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is a public-key encryption scheme which 
provides semantic security against an adversary who is allowed to use chosen-plaintext 
and chosen-ciphertext attacks, also known as the Elliptic Curve Augmented Encryption 
Scheme (ECAES) or simply the Elliptic Curve Encryption Scheme. 
 
Other extensions as shown in [43] are: The Group Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (GECDH) 
protocol which is an extension of GDH based on ECDLP, and Tree-based Group Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman (TGECDH) which is a variant of TGDH based on ECDLP. 
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2.7.2 Key Establishment Process 
The process by which two or more entities (in our case Ad-Hoc nodes) establish a shared 
secret key (session key) in order to be used to achieve some cryptographic goals, such 
as confidentiality or data integrity is called: Key Establishment Process [58]. 
We can classify the Key Establishment Process by its distribution, or by the prior 
information that each entity has before starting the process: 
2.7.2.1 By its distribution 
The key distribution problem in MANET is the problem of how to set up secret keys 
between communicating nodes [59]. There are two possible modes of distribution: Key 
Transport and Key Agreement.  
- Key Transport Protocols: A key is generated by one entity sometimes called CA 
(Certificate Authority) and then is transmitted through a secure channel to a second entity 
[58]; this mode of distribution is also known as Key Management.  
- Key Agreement Protocols: Also known as Key Exchange Protocols both parties perform 
a negotiation process in order to contribute information to generate and exchange a 
secret key. 
2.7.2.2 By the prior information 
There are two possible modes of Key Establishment: Symmetric and Asymmetric 
protocols.  
- Symmetric Protocols: The two entities have from the beginning of the process common 
secret information for the establishment of the key. 
- Asymmetric Protocols: The two entities involved only share public information that has 
been authenticated previously. 
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2.7.3 Why ECC in MANET? 
 
There are many reasons why there have been introduced the concept of ECC in MANET. 
According to [11] and [41], Compared to traditional cryptosystems like RSA, ECC offers 
equivalent security with smaller key sizes, faster computation, lower power consumption, 
as well as memory and bandwidth savings. This is especially useful for mobile devices 
which are typically limited in terms of their CPU, power and network connectivity. 
 
In [42], it is shown how the energy cost for RSA is greater than that of an ECDSA (a 
Signature Algorithm of ECC) showing better performance.  
 
However, in [43] although it is recognized that attraction of ECC is that it appears to offer 
equal security for a far smaller key size, thereby reducing processing overhead, also is 
showed that: the methods for computing general elliptic curve discrete logarithms are 
much less efficient than those for factoring or computing conventional discrete logarithms 
and it indicates that more computation time is required for ECC and considers that the 
overall performance of ECDLP-based applications needs to be evaluated. 
However, compared to many other conventional cryptosystems, ECC is a very good 
alternative to the characteristics of a MANET. 
2.7.4 ECC Proposals Applied to MANET (Related Work) 
There are several proposals based on ECC that advertise to guarantee security in Ad-hoc 
networks. The proposals focus their research on ECC according to certain features in 
MANET. We can classify the proposals: by the organization of the nodes in the network, 
by the Key Establishment Process and by the use of MANET as a way of implementation 
and improvement of ECC. 
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2.7.4.1 By the organization of the nodes in the network 
This is one of the features that take into account the proposals based on ECC due to 
dynamic network topology. For example [64] presents an organization of the nodes 
through a Region-Based Group, where a group of nodes in a region, which in turn is 
divided into sub-groups that are responsible for keeping your keys using GECDH Protocol 
and links with other subgroups in a tree structure using TGECDH protocol with nodes 
which are assigned tasks of communication management. A similar organization is found 
in [65] based on networks Near Term Digital Radio (NTDR) presents an organization 
Cluster-based where all mobile nodes are divided into different clusters controlled by 
clusterheads and with two Classes of communication intra-cluster and inter-cluster using 
ECC. Other Cluster-based proposals using ECC are [66], [67]. Another organizational 
scheme is the proposed Self-Organization [68] where each node of the network after 
establishing key groups and subgroups, operates synchronously regular updating of their 
keys in order to let in new members to the network. Another type of organization applied 
in MANET using ECC is the Threshold Cryptography as in [69] where no one has the 
complete key, but there are a number of nodes t (t = Threshold) with a piece of this and 
the t nodes are required to encrypt and/or decrypt a message. Another proposal that uses 
Threshold based on ECC is [70]. 
2.7.4.2 By Key Establishment Process 
When implementing ECC in MANET, the Related Works focus on the type of Key 
Establishment Process to use, which we studied earlier in this document (section 2.7.2.). 
Some proposals use Key Management Protocols as in [71] with Cluster-based 
organization, or [70] with Threshold organization. Another proposals applying ECC in 
MANET with Key Management are: [72], [73], [74], [75], [76], [77]. Some proposals use 
Key Agreement Protocols as [78] that seeks resist the off-line password guessing attack, 
others simply apply ECDH in its Key Agreement Protocol as [79]. Other proposals 
applying ECC in MANET with Key Agreement are [64] and [80]. 
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2.7.4.3 By the Use of MANET as a Way of Implementation and 
Improvement of ECC 
Some proposals study the application of software libraries to implement ECC on MANET 
as [63] and [81]. In [82] is presented a fuzzy controller for a dynamic window sizing to 
optimize the calculation of an ECC scalar multiplication and evaluate their performance in 
MANET. In [83] is sought through the code development over some microcontrollers the 
optimization faster implementation of an ECC in MANET. In [42] is compared the 
application of ECC versus RSA in MANET in order to observe their strengths and in [59] 
shows how some ECC implementations have some limitations on MANET performance. 
2.8 ECC Implementation During Wormhole Attack In 
MANET 
2.8.1 Security Requirements In MANET 
In order to combat passive and active attacks [84], according to [85] a secure Ad-hoc 
network is expected to meet the following different security requirements: 
- Confidentiality: Only the intended receivers should be able to interpret the 
transmitted data. 
- Integrity: Data should not change during the transmission process, i.e., data 
integrity must be ensured. 
- Availability: Network services should be available all the time and it should be 
possible to correct failures to keep the connection stable. 
- Authentication: Every transmitting or receiving node has its own signature. Nodes 
must be able to authenticate that the data has been sent by the legitimate node. 
- Non-repudiation: Sender of a message shall not be able to later deny sending the 
message and that the recipients shall not be able to deny the receipt after 
receiving the message. 
And [86] adds another requirement: 
- Access and usage control: Access control makes sure that access to information 
resource is controlled by the Ad-Hoc networks. Usage control ensures the 
information resource is used correctly by the authorized nodes having the 
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corresponding rights. This mechanism provides the ability to control information 
after it is transmitted. 
2.8.2 Aspects to Ensure Security in MANET 
In [86] and [87] are proposed three key aspects to be covered by any security policy on 
Ad-Hoc networks in order to satisfy the aforementioned 6 Security Requirements in 
Section 2.8.1. 
2.8.2.1 Intrusion detection  
Intrusion detection based on analysis of network behaviors is defined as a process of 
monitoring activities in a system which can be a computer or a network to detect 
anomalies. [104]. The mechanism that performs this task is called an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS). 
According to [86] the intrusion detection techniques can be classified into misuse 
detection and anomaly detection. 
- The misuse detection: Uses patterns of known attacks to match these when they 
are applied and the IDS to detect. The advantage is that an attack can be detected 
previously analyzed accurately, but lacks the capacity to detect new attacks. Another 
disadvantage of this type of IDS is the complexity in modeling patterns of known 
attacks, due to the dynamic MANET topology. 
 
- The anomaly detection: Monitors the behavior of nodes and events generated on 
the network to detect signs of intrusion. This type of monitoring to detect new attacks, 
but its main disadvantage is that it can generate false alarms. 
2.8.2.2 Secure routing  
Establishing a reliable and secure route between each pair of nodes. According to [105] 
the most common attacks that attack the routing protocols are:  
- Attacks using modification 
o Redirection by modifying route sequence number 
o Redirection by modifying hop count 
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o Source route modification 
o Tunneling 
- Attacks using fabrication 
o Falsifying route errors 
o Broadcast falsified routes 
- Spoofing attacks 
- Rushing attacks 
 
Establish a secure routing protocol means to counter these attacks on the time to find a 
suitable route for communication between nodes. 
2.8.2.3 Key management service 
Generation of authentication, digital signature and encryption of information. 
It is important to note that [86] and [88] state that is not enough to implement a Key 
Management Service, it should be accompanied by the other two types of solutions 
including network security policies. 
2.8.3 Key Management Service Attributes 
Returning to the Key Management Service aspect from the three previous Key aspects in 
section 2.8.2., when applying a security policy in MANET according to [84] a Key 
Management Service (For Example a: key agreement protocol) must conform to number 
of desirable attributes: 
a) Known session keys. A protocol still achieves its goal in the face of an adversary 
who has learned some previous session keys. 
b) Perfect forward secrecy. If long-term secrets of one or more entities are 
compromised, the secrecy of previous session keys is not affected. 
c) Unknown key-share. An entity (in our case an Ad-Hoc node) cannot be coerced 
into sharing a key with other entity without its knowledge. 
d) Key-compromise impersonation. When the secret value is disclosed an 
adversary that knows this value can now impersonate one entity. Even so, the 
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opponent to know this information cannot impersonate the entity attempting to 
supplant. 
e) Loss of information. Compromise of other information that would not ordinarily 
be available to an adversary does not affect the security of the protocol. 
f) Message independence. Individual flows of a protocol run between two honest 
entities are unrelated. 
 
Additionally, [89] states that in terms of computation load a Key management service 
should fulfill:  
 
g) Computational efficiency. This includes the number of operations required to 
execute a protocol. In order to achieve this property, the protocol should have the 
minimum number of operation as possible. 
h) Communication efficiency. This includes the number of passes (message 
exchanges) and the bandwidth required (total number of bits transmitted). 
 
2.8.4 Levels of Security Against a Wormhole  
Based on [9] and [90] we have developed a model against Wormhole Attack in MANET 
for establishing different required levels of security against this attack. There are several 
levels of security that can determine the state that the Wormhole intrusion is. These 
security levels can be applied in chronological order before, during and after the attack. 
The idea is to classify these levels in order to determine what strategy to take against a 
Wormhole. These levels are: 
a) Preventing (Avoiding): Consists of applying one or more strategies to avoid 
creating a Wormhole tunnel. That is, this level of security is applied when the 
attack does not exist yet. 
b) Predicting (Hypothesizing): Is the strategy which aims to find by observing 
suspicious behavior on the network that can lead to detection of an attack. These 
observations can validate transmission times (latencies), sudden changes in the 
ways of routing among others. 
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c) Detecting (Locating): Once the prediction activities yield positive results from a 
Wormhole attack, proceeds to locate malicious nodes within the network, 
identifying their routes, the nodes involved, committed network regions, among 
others. 
d) Analyzing: Is the level where it seeks to take action against the detected attack. 
The strategy to use is of vital importance since it cannot afford to keep going on 
the attack. 
e) Mitigating (Evading): It is the action which removes the impact of the attack 
within the network, even if malicious nodes are present within it. The full 
identification of the attack will lead to the preparation of the nodes to avoid 
communication with the colluder nodes. 
f) Removing: Is the level where the Wormhole tunnel, is permanently excluded. The 
nodes within the network know which of them are malicious, and they do not carry 
out any task of communication with them. They are excluded from the routing 
tables and the reliable links in the network are recognized. 
2.8.5 Analysis of the Behavior of ECC for the Wormhole Intrusion 
As shown in section 2.5.2. of this document, some previous studies have stated that 
applied to MANET, the cryptosystems are not enough to counter a Wormhole attack. For 
example [3] states: “The attack can also still be performed even if the network 
communication provides confidentiality and authenticity, and even if the attacker has no 
cryptographic keys” or as in the case of [2] where says: “Also some approaches rely on 
using source authentication using signing keys. Such defenses can be defeated if a node 
is compromised and the attacker has access to secured information”.  
Let's analyze these assertions: 
- Is it possible that an ECC is the only efficient way of security within an Ad-Hoc 
network?: The answer is No [110]. As discussed in this document (Section 2.8.2.): 
in [86] and [87] must take into account three key aspects when implementing a 
security policy in Ad-Hoc networks: Intrusion Detection, Secure Routing and Key 
Management Service. The ECC would be involved only in the Key Management 
Service process. 
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- Are the proposed ECC able to satisfy the Security Requirements in MANETs 
presented in section 2.8.1.?: The only requirements to be satisfy with applied ECC 
in MANET, are those of Authentication and the Confidentiality, since they are 
precisely the functions of any cryptosystem in MANET, however, cannot be 
guaranteed the remaining requirements, being that Wormhole attack directly 
affects the Routing process [3] and the attacker can carry out Denial of Service 
(Not would be met Non-repudiation neither Availability), packet alteration (Not 
would be met Integrity), or Disrupt routing and Spoofing attack (Not would be met 
Access and usage control).  
 
- Could "the current proposals for ECC" satisfy the Attributes of a Key Management 
Service (Section 2.8.3.) in middle of a wormhole attack?: The ECC attributes that 
are affected in a negative way with a Wormhole intrusion are: Key-compromise 
impersonation, Loss of information and Message independence. As discussed in 
Section 2.5.2. of this document are precisely the characteristics of the wormhole 
that affect these attributes. Wormhole is able to impersonate a node pretending to 
be reliable, to impersonate a node has the ability to share information with 
members of the network nodes and even participate in a Key Establishment 
Process. At this point it does lose the Message Independence, because there is 
communication between a malicious node and a belonging node on the network. 
Information loss occurs with packet capture by malicious nodes and the attacker's 
ability to do with them as it pleases. However, revisiting some of the proposals of 
Related Work some important things can be seen: In [64] can be guaranteed Key-
compromise impersonation, considering the organization of the network into 
groups and sub-groups. This makes the nodes know each other, despite being 
limited organization considering a node outside the network will make it harder to 
belong to it, however, prevent the rapid generation of a Wormhole tunnel. In 
addition, it would satisfy the Computational efficiency and Communication 
efficiency attributes, because as we saw in Section 2.7.3., the implementation of 
the GECDH and TGECDH protocols have better performance than other 
traditional cryptography schemes. In the same way happen with the Cluster-based 
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organization proposals, e.g.: [65], [66] and [67], such organizations can avoid 
impersonation given the high level of reliability between neighboring nodes and 
distrust generated by the entry of a new node to the network,  have their 
advantages and disadvantages.  
 
- The ECC proposals that are applied to MANET Can they perform the actions 
carried out in the levels of security against Wormhole attack (section 2.8.4.)? The 
answer is No. The actions and strategies that fall within these security levels are 
not exactly an ECC task, but an Intrusion Detection System. 
 
- If the ECC application in MANET is not sufficient to offset the Wormhole Attack, 
Should it be combined with other solutions so that it can be applied? The answer 
is Yes. As we saw previously an ECC application is part of the Key Management 
Service, but it requires being mixed with "Intrusion detection Systems" and 
"Secure routing solutions" to attack the Wormhole intruder. In fact, some 
proposals that apply ECC in their solutions, combine it with other strategies: For 
example in [67] it is performed an estimation of trust values of neighbors, a Secure 
end-to-end route discovery using Antnet routing mechanism is carried out and it is 
mixed with mutual authentication using ECC. Such combinations prevents many of 
the actions of a wormhole attack and there is used an ECC. 
 
  
 
  
 
3. Chapter 3 
3.1 Proposed Solution and Justification 
To bring a solution to counter the Wormhole attack using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, it is 
necessary to return to the conclusion in previous chapters on the need to combine three 
aspects of security in MANET: Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Key Management 
Service and Secure Routing Algorithms (See Section 2.8.2.). 
 
We begin by making a description of the simulator to use and their technical 
characteristics, then there will be a MANET environment analysis required in the model 
simulations in terms of mobility, routing protocols, features resources between nodes, 
number of nodes to simulate Area, time simulation model of data collection and 
organization of the nodes. Then there will be a description of the proposed solution by 
combining the three aspects of security: Understanding Using Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography, Description of Intrusion Detection System to use and justification and 
choice of secure routing algorithms. Finally, the simulations describe the development, 
will present the software architecture model and class models.  
3.2 MANET Environmental Construction 
3.2.1 Simulator Description 
We have chosen the simulator NS-2 [106] to build the MANET environment, the intruder 
and security solution. There is now a NS-3 version of the simulator, but there is more 
documentation of the NS-2 and as many classes available for MANET environments. 
NS-2 is a discrete event simulator targeted at networking research with GNU General 
Public License, based built in C++ with simulation interface through OTcl. It will run on 
Windows XP with Cygwin interface on a computer with 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5 Processor 
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and 4 gigabytes of RAM. NAM tool will be used as a GUI tool simulator and XGRAPH to 
plot results. 
3.2.2 Choice of the System Organization of Network Nodes  
As discussed in previous chapters organizing systems Ad-Hoc networks and cluster-
based are very safe when analyzing which nodes are part of the network nodes avoiding 
strangers enter to carry out attacks such as organization maintains a closed nodes with 
the same participants as well as the use of hierarchies where a Cluster Head node acts 
as a CA (Certification Authority) and nodes know their subjects. However, this approach 
does not always serve for any application in Ad-Hoc networks. This approach would be 
useful for military applications battlefield as we know hardly change hierarchies and 
similarly there is a dynamic and constantly to expand the number of participants in the 
network. However, for other applications such as rescue operations, financial 
transactions, conferences, among others, it is useful to use this type of organization and 
tightly restricts access to new members who want to be part of the network. Thus we see 
that the system of organization of the nodes of the network, either through a hierarchical 
system or one where all nodes maintain the same level of responsibility, are valid, but its 
use depends on the application of the network.  
 
For this work we decided to develop a solution against the Wormhole attack on networks 
that do not have a hierarchical organizational system in order to evaluate the performance 
of the network through a wormhole attack when nodes that are not part of the network 
wish to enter the same. It also extends the use of ECC using a system based on 
Threshold Cryptography agreement where all the nodes will have a portion of the private 
key. 
3.2.3 Other Features to Consider For the Solution 
Because the behavior of the solution will be tested in a series of simulations is necessary 
to establish the extent of these by naming the nodes features. Networks will be simulated 
with a number not more than 200 nodes. Nodes that have the same characteristics 
simulate each other, with radius equal transfer, bandwidth between nodes the same for 
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any link, and power capacity, power and memory of the nodes equally among them. I.e. it 
simulates a homogeneous MANET (the heterogeneous MANET are those in which the 
nodes have different resource characteristics together). The detail of the physical 
characteristics of each set of nodes and the type of link that will have each other will be 
specified later in each simulation run. 
Another feature that will ad-hoc networks to be simulated is the routing protocol. For our 
work we take the well-known and most studied reactive routing protocol AODV. 
Another feature to be taken into account in the simulations is the size of the area to 
simulate and simulation times. The idea is to simulate areas greater than our 5000 square 
meters with interactions up to 20 minutes. 
3.3 Intruder Construction 
Wormhole tunnel will be constructed of type Out-of-band (See section 2.5.3.3.) to perform 
actions of attack Denial-of-Service (DoS) and replay the packets altering the Intercepted 
packets. 
3.4 Design Solution of Detection and Evasion 
3.4.1 IDS to Use Against Wormhole 
Returning to the earlier study of the solutions that have been raised to counter the attack 
Wormhole (See Section 2.5.4) based on the analysis of [104] which assesses the 
performance of intrusion detection systems it is decided to choose for this work a 
Distributed and Cooperative IDS based on agents monitoring neighboring Anomaly 
Detection rate [86]. Among the advantages are: 
- The level of observation is large since no abnormalities are observed only in the node 
itself but also on the behavior of neighbors. 
- It detects malicious - routing is the first thing that strikes an intrusion Wormhole. 
- The use of network resources is low. 
- You can detect attacks varied as producing a new wormhole and are not known. 
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3.4.2 Safe Routing System to Use 
The idea is to use the well-known AODV routing protocol [91], however, expanding its 
functionality without changing it. To do this, take the safe routing protocol AODV: "S-
AODV: Secure Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing". [107]. Based on 
information and non-mutable mutable AODV packets as they travel through the network, 
this protocol uses two security mechanisms: A digital signature system to authenticate 
non-mutable information and an implementation of hash chains in order to verify that the 
hop count of RREQ and RREP messages have not altered by an attacker Been [108]. 
However, since the idea is to combine the three aspects of security (see Section 2.8.2.), 
What we do for the digital signature system is to implement an algorithm ECDSA on 
RREQ routing packets and S-AODV RREP. The implementation of this algorithm will call 
EC-S-AODV. 
3.4.3 Review of the ECC Implementation for the Solution 
To mitigate the most of the actions to carry out an attack like Wormhole is necessary to 
apply an ECC system for authentication, generation/trading public key and digital 
signature in compliance with the aspect Key Management Service. To this were 
implemented ECDSA and ECDH protocol in two phases. A first phase as we have seen in 
the previous section applies where an ECDSA digital signature system on S-AODV 
protocol when generating the routing process which we call EC-S-AODV. The other 
phase is the implementation of ECDSA digital signature system for when the last packet 
RREP has been received successfully by the source node information and begins the 
process of sending data packets with payload. This will be done using the same public 
key for the two phases. The key agreement process will be done through the scheme 
ECDH. 
 
  
Chapter 3 47
 
3.5 Summary of the Solution Represented In Simulations 
Based on the issues just mentioned the summary of features has the simulations is [111]: 
Table 3-1: Summary of features in Simulations. 
FEATURE DESCRIPTION 
Simulator NS-2 Version 2.7 
Mobility model  Random Waypoint (RWP) 
Routing Protocol  Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing 
(AODV) 
Characteristics of resources 
between nodes Homogeneous 
Number of nodes Less than or equal to 200 
Area to simulate Less than or equal to 5000 square feet 
Simulation time less than 20 minutes 
Organization of Nodes Nonhierarchical 
Model data collection stochastic 
IDS to use Distributed and Cooperative agent-based 
monitoring of neighbors of Anomaly Detection 
type 
Secure routing system to use EC-S-AODV 
Implementation of ECC ECDSA for digital signature 
 
3.6 List of Simulations 
The simulations were performed are: 
- Simulation of the mobility model 
- Simulation of the routing protocol 
- Simulation of Wormhole intrusion 
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- Simulation of the IDS 
- Simulation of the implementation of ECC for authentication, digital signature and key 
negotiation with the routing protocol secure 
- Simulation with the whole scenario 
- Other simulations: Zero Knowledge and OLSR routing algorithm 
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3.7 Solution Architecture 
3.7.1 Background of the Solution and Logical Layers 
This section shows the analysis of component structure of the solution architecture. 
Figure 3-1: Software solution components. 
 
 
The solution designed contains the following functional components: 
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- Node: is the component that contains the general behavior of the elements of the 
simulation. Within the same component are inherited routing algorithms, ECC, IDS and 
the basic characteristics of the nodes. 
- Communication: is the component that coordinates communication between the nodes. 
Routing methods communicate directly with this and that is where management is 
developed to generate messages according to the AODV protocol. 
- Information Collector: is the component that captures the statistical information from 
the simulation and writes trace files. These same files are then used to graph the results. 
- Transverse component: The component that handles the basic configuration of the 
environment and visual manager of it. 
3.7.2 Random Waypoint - Class Model  
Below is the class model of RWP mobility model used. Java was initially designed as 
shown in Fig. Then implemented on the NS-2 simulator using C language classes already 
built and implemented an interface OTcl to use these classes. 
Figure 3-1: Random Waypoint – Class model. 
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Figure 3-2: Random Waypoint on OTcl. 
 
3.7.3 AODV Packages - Class Model 
Taking into account the different types of packets used in the AODV routing protocol, was 
initially a model of their respective relationship in terms of Java classes (see figure 3-4). 
Then in NS-2 was implemented to perform the capture of important data for this work, 
using the AODV model that already exists in the simulation tool and modifying the trace 
files. 
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Figure 3-1: AODV packages - class model. 
 
3.7.4 ECC Application - Class Model 
Java was initially performed on a design for the implementation of an ECC in MANET, 
then took this design and were built in C++ classes for NS-2. Finally with OTcl interface is 
generated using this model. It is important to note that we used the finite Galois field 
GF(ॲ2m). 
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Figure 3-1: ECC application - class model. 
 
 
 
3.7.5 Cross Components - Class Model  
Initially a model was constructed to link the Java transverse components and 
characteristics of the system, taking into account routing, mobility model, packet types 
and physical characteristics. Then, using the characteristics of the NS-2 simulator, took 
the packages that already existed and were built that are not included in the tool. 
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Figure 3-1: Cross Components - class model. 
 
 
 
3.8 Description of Simulations 
3.8.1 Simulation of the Mobility Model 
It builds the NS-2 simulation of the Random Waypoint mobility model initially for 5 nodes. 
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Figure 3-1: Simulation of the mobility model. 5 nodes. 
 
Then for 50 nodes 
Figure 3-2: Simulation of the mobility model. 50 nodes. 
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3.8.2 Simulation of the Routing Protocol 
It builds the NS-2 simulation of AODV routing protocol using C + + classes of the tool and 
adding functionality to implement the secure algorithm. It is tested for 10 nodes. NAM are 
shown in blue nodes are communicating through the protocol. 
Figure 3-1: Simulation of the routing protocol. 
 
3.8.3 Simulation of the Wormhole Intrusion  
Wormhole tunnel is simulated using some existing packages and modifying the tool 
features Denial of Service. Attackers are represented on NAM as red nodes. 
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Figure 3-1: Simulation of the wormhole intrusion. 
 
3.8.4 Simulation of the Wormhole Detection 
Classes are implemented the solution by modifying the AODV algorithm, adding the 
functionality of the S-AODV and then making EC-S-AODV. After implementing a nodes 
monitor for the IDS. Green shows the node with the agent that detected the intrusion 
monitoring using IDS protocol without using EC-S-AODV. 
Figure 3-1: Simulation of the wormhole detection. 
. 

  
 
4. Chapter 4 
After implementing the simulations described in the previous chapter of this thesis were 
collected traceability data files to evaluate several of the behaviors that had the job of 
simulation [111] and plotted in the tool NS-2 simulator called Xgraph, disabling the NAM 
tool after confirming the behavior of the network with few nodes visually. Then see the 
results. 
 
4.1 Experimental and Results - Behavior of Intruder 
We initially experimented with simulations representing MANET environment (including 
mobility model, routing algorithm and other physical characteristics of the network), where 
a tunnel was present type Wormhole Out-of-band formed by two malicious nodes. In the 
first simulation was created Wormhole tunnel but disable any harmful action I could take 
this to validate how many messages were sent from any node transmitter and how many 
messages were received by any receiving node to determine the efficiency of 
transmission / reception network and similarly how many packets passing through the 
tunnel that took no active action.  
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Figure 4-1: Simulation 1 - Results. 
 
In the graph, the red line represents the number of packets sent from any point on the 
network, ie, whenever any node in time sent packages that number added to this value. 
The line in blue represents the number of packets received from anywhere in the network, 
ie, whenever any node in the received packet time that number added to this value. The 
line in green represents the number of nodes that are happening in a given time through 
the wormhole tunnel, ie, it is count from when a packet arrives from a malicious node and 
another node reaches the attacker. As we can see there are points where most packages 
are sent at time t but is due to the accumulation of packages that have not been received 
and may be traveling in the course of time as they reach their goal. What we cannot stop 
looking at is the number of packets that are passing through the tunnel. Extracting the 
data for graphing in a controlled manner and by sampling 40 simulations of 5 minutes 
each with 200 nodes values are obtained as follows. 
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Table 4-1:  Number of packets sent / received in a time t and number of packets that pass 
through the tunnel. 
 
Test 32  PACKAGES 
TIME ti SENT 
THROUGH 
THE 
TUNNEL 
RECEIVED 
t1 34 0 0 
t2 56 23 0 
t3 12 2 45 
t4 6 3 32 
t5 4 0 2 
t6 45 23 34 
t7 67 38 45 
t8 91 67 63 
t9 180 89 79 
t10 32 10 68 
t11 45 40 113 
t12 72 51 47 
t13 4 2 34 
t14 49 37 10 
t15 34 23 3 
t16 56 49 4 
t17 67 34 2 
t18 34 11 5 
t19 37 14 119 
t20 39 28 89 
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Figure 4-2: Number of packets sent / received in a time t and number of packets that 
pass through the tunnel. 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Number of packets sent / received in total in a simulation and the number 
of packets that pass through the tunnel. 
 
Pondering the results of the simulations, 81.34% of the packets sent are received 
successfully. This is a very common value for AODV reception. It was also found that 
55.19% of the packets pass through the tunnel. Note that here are not making an active 
attack, simply by a passive attack is analyzing the traffic that passes through the tunnel 
without taking some negative action as we have discussed in the section 2.5.2. 
 
Chapter 4 63
 
Then, we performed the same test but this time an action is triggered of denial of service 
in the tunnel to drop all packets passing through it (BlackHole Attack). (See Figure 4-4). 
Figure 4-4: Number of packets sent / received in total in a simulation and the number 
of packets that pass through the tunnel with an active attack. 
 
Given the same conventions, ie Red line: packets sent from anywhere in the network, 
Blue line: packets received and Green line: packets passing through the wormhole tunnel 
we noticed the large packet loss that occurs when the attack venturing with an action of 
denial of service. 
Extracting the data for graphing in a controlled manner and by sampling 40 simulations of 
5 minutes each with 200 nodes values are obtained as follows. 
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Table 4-2:  Number of packets sent / received in a time t and number of packets that pass 
through the tunnel with an active denial of service attack. 
 
Test 11  PACKAGES 
TIME ti SENT 
THROUGH 
THE 
TUNNEL 
RECEIVED 
t1 2 0 0 
t2 5 0 0 
t3 45 2 3 
t4 4 3 6 
t5 7 0 2 
t6 16 3 3 
t7 34 38 5 
t8 52 67 1 
t9 64 89 13 
t10 79 10 23 
t11 92 40 10 
t12 90 51 4 
t13 45 2 1 
t14 2 37 0 
t15 34 23 0 
t16 56 49 0 
t17 67 34 2 
t18 3 11 5 
t19 37 14 11 
t20 39 28 2 
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Figure 4-5: Number of packets sent / received in a time t and number of packets that 
pass through the tunnel with an active denial of service attack. 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Number of packets sent / received in total in a simulation and number of 
packets that pass through the tunnel with an active denial of service attack. 
 
Pondering the results of the simulations with the active attack, and were not successful 
81.34% of packets sent but only received the 11.72%. This shows the great amount of 
information that is lost when a wormhole attack occurs. 
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4.2 Results of the Detection and Evasion 
This set of simulations includes two stages of implementation of safety, a protocol of the 
EC-S-AODV (mixing secure routing aspects and Key Management Service using ECC) 
and the other is the application of IDS agents for monitoring nodes. 
Applying EC-S-AODV from the start in the default routing and assigning a key agreement 
private and public, the tunnel was totally void. This is because the simulation validation 
was included which asked for authentication and when a node does not answer simply is 
discarded from the routing process. This would simulate an environment where attackers 
are external to the network and do not know the key and it is impossible for them to 
authenticate to be able to pose as trusted nodes. 
Figure 4-1: Number of packets sent / received in total in a simulation and number of 
packets that pass through the tunnel with an active denial of service attack and a EC-S-
AODV functional protocol. 
 
However, this result should be reviewed further. Disabling communication with the 
attackers is made by S-AODV protocol using authentication by elliptic curves, 
notwithstanding this prohibition depends on the capture of the attacker's IP address. It is 
necessary to check that media can be used to completely disable the attack in order to 
mitigate the tunnel to where it is impossible to capture the IP address when an 
authentication request message cannot capture that direction. Another important aspect is 
to show that when the solution was applied to the amount of payload packets after 
receiving the RREP decreased by 18.56% compared to the non-implementation of the 
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solution and when the attack does not hurt. That is, the authentication process lowers the 
rate of flow of messages in the network. Still, there is a very high value even more 
considering that the implementation of an ECC saves network resources compared to 
other solutions based on cryptography. 
Table 4-3:  Number of packets sent / received in total in a simulation and number of 
packets that pass through the tunnel with an active denial of service attack and a EC-S-
AODV functional protocol. 
Test 26  PACKAGES 
TIEMPO ti ENVIADOS A TRAVÉS DEL TÚNEL RECIBIDOS 
t1 2 0 0 
t2 1 0 1 
t3 34 0 0 
t4 21 0 31 
t5 32 3 4 
t6 34 3 45 
t7 61 7 9 
t8 89 34 18 
t9 102 45 34 
t10 98 34 67 
t11 65 45 25 
t12 72 56 36 
t13 56 65 47 
t14 34 12 87 
t15 97 1 23 
t16 67 23 32 
t17 43 34 3 
t18 19 56 2 
t19 61 12 37 
t20 31 26 12 
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The other simulation that was carried out in a second phase was to apply the security 
system where the attackers are part of the network and create a tunnel to generate a 
denial of service. In this case the nodes know the keys necessary to authenticate and can 
form a tunnel protocol mocking EC-S-AODV. That's where we evaluate the 
implementation of IDS monitoring nodes. The result was as follows. 
Figure 4-2: Number of packets sent / received in total in a simulation and number of 
packets that pass through the tunnel with an active denial of service attack and a 
Distributed and Cooperative IDS. 
 
The IDS Agent running received information from other nodes belonging to other 
irregularity in the number RERR message generation. Note that the attack was present at 
one time online doing damage until the alarm is raised to detect the intruder. The intruder 
is identified with the routes monitored and the punishment given to IP addresses that 
generate an error message number greater than allowed (the number of messages is 20 
messages RERR every 40 seconds, however this parameter can be varied and is under 
study to find the optimal limit). After lifting the alarm sends a broadcast message 
informing nodes eliminating routes that are considered attackers. This process takes 
some time which is what can be displayed on the graph where the action is fast but not 
immediate. 
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Table 4-4:  Number of packets sent / received in total in a simulation and number of 
packets that pass through the tunnel with an active denial of service attack and a 
Distributed and Cooperative IDS. 
 
Test 29 PACKAGES 
TIEMPO ti ENVIADOS A TRAVÉS DEL TÚNEL RECIBIDOS 
t1 3 0 0 
t2 6 0 5 
t3 52 0 7 
t4 12 0 23 
t5 10 0 35 
t6 7 12 15 
t7 61 18 4 
t8 48 11 15 
t9 72 0 23 
t10 94 0 51 
t11 81 0 24 
t12 79 0 57 
t13 54 0 69 
t14 23 0 26 
t15 83 0 29 
t16 47 0 41 
t17 46 0 32 
t18 24 0 21 
t19 73 0 22 
t20 42 0 71 
 
 
 

  
 
5. Chapter 5 
5.1 Conclusions 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a good choice to implement authentication and 
information security in MANET, since it has features that make it viable when used in 
networks with limited resources. However, the implementation of an ECC is not enough to 
counter the Wormhole attack. It is necessary to combine these security and authentication 
methods with other approaches like: intrusion detection systems and secure routing 
algorithms. Such combinations will make not only to counter an attack as complex and 
dangerous as the Wormhole, but should be set very high levels of security against other 
attacks. In this thesis, we have done a very broad survey about the Wormhole attack and 
the application of ECC in MANET in order to conclude that, in terms of ensuring security 
in MANET, ECC is not sufficient but necessary. 
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